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Foreign exchange intervention and policy: 
Bank Indonesia experiences 
1997 - October 2004 
1. Introduction 
The foreign exchange market in Indonesia has been developing in conjunction with changes in the 
exchange rate regime, which has moved gradually toward increased emphasis on market 
mechanisms. Essentially, the foreign exchange system is evolving from tight government control 
towards a free foreign exchange system, while the exchange rate system is moving progressively from 
a fixed exchange rate towards a flexible exchange rate system, at a pace consistent with prevailing 
economic conditions. 
Since the adoption of free floating in mid-1997, the experience of sharp and persistent depreciations of 
the rupiah, sudden short term capital outflows, and a fragile domestic financial sector collectively 
motivated structural changes in Indonesia’s foreign currency market. Bank Indonesia, as stipulated in 
the Bank Indonesia Act, has implemented several policies to maintain exchange rate stability, 
including intensive monitoring of foreign exchange market transactions, moral suasion, foreign 
currency intervention in the domestic foreign exchange markets, and direct controls through relevant 
regulations. 
Since Indonesia moved from managed to free floating on 14 August 1997, intervention has been used 
primarily as a liquidity management tool to offset government expenditures. At the same time, such 
interventions can also stabilise rupiah volatility, especially during rapid depreciations associated with 
excess liquidity. Thus intervention, through tightening domestic liquidity by the sale of foreign 
exchange, can be used as a framework to influence the exchange rate. As well as absorbing excess 
rupiah liquidity, intervention by way of selling foreign currency also aims at lessening the volatility of 
the exchange rate; easing market pressures; and by its nature, adding foreign currency liquidity into a 
market which is often marked by lack of supply. 
This paper reviews the development of the rupiah during period 1997 to 2004 and explains the 
activities of Bank Indonesia in maintaining the stability of the exchange rate. 
2.  Foreign currency intervention 
2.1 Overview 
Just like other central banks, Bank Indonesia has the authority to carry out foreign currency 
intervention at both policy and operational levels. Foreign currency intervention policies are mainly 
intended to maintain exchange rate stability, particularly at times when there are factors that impact 
negatively on the rupiah. Nevertheless, foreign exchange intervention is only undertaken when moral 
suasion is ineffective in influencing market participants and curbing excessive exchange rate 
movements.  
Internal Bank Indonesia guidelines and regulations that guide and constrain foreign currency 
intervention emphasise efficient implementation, taking into account factors such as market liquidity 
conditions, transaction turnover, and market psychology. The execution of foreign currency 
intervention policy is varied as regards both timing and magnitude, in order to avoid predictability. 
Intervention operations are conducted in a measured and careful manner, recognising the importance 
of foreign exchange reserve adequacy. 
Supply and demand conditions in the foreign currency market are always taken into account. When 
appropriate, the sale of US dollars in the domestic foreign exchange market is structured so as to 
provide a resistance level for the currency, with the objective of reducing the probability of exchange 
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Bank Indonesia does not announce foreign currency intervention to the public, reserving to itself 
information regarding volume, strategy, and timing. However, Bank Indonesia will continuously and 
very closely monitor foreign currency transaction activities, either indirectly via on-screen figures and 
broker’s information (off-site supervision), or directly (on-site supervision). 
2.2 Transaction  types 
Under the existing law, Bank Indonesia has the right to conduct all types of foreign currency 
transactions for intervention purposes. Yet Bank Indonesia intervenes mainly through spot 
transactions which dominate the domestic foreign exchange market. The choice of spot transactions 
for intervention relates to factors such as: 
–  The volume of spot transactions is relatively large in the domestic market. 
–  Spot transactions have the potential to influence price movement immediately. 
–  Spot transaction patterns can indicate speculative market behaviour. 
–  Spot transaction volumes can reflect the volatility of the exchange rate. For example, spot 
transaction volumes are almost in line with rupiah volatility, so they can be used as 
consideration in the decision to intervene. 
2.3  Timing and magnitude 
Given that maintaining exchange rate stability is the prime objective of foreign exchange rate 
intervention, volatility is the main criterion determining the volume and timing of intervention. For this 
reason, the volume of foreign currency intervention significantly increased following the 
implementation of free floating in August 1997. At the same time, periods of intervention became more 
sporadic. 
2001 recorded the highest level of the rupiah at Rp 10,256 in annual average terms (see Graph 1), 
and also the highest volatility. Accordingly, 2001 also saw substantial intervention as Bank Indonesia 
attempted to maintain exchange rate volatility within a reasonable range. 
Graph 1 
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2.4  Method of intervention 
Intervention methods can be classified into two types. First, the open method is intervention directly 
with the market without using an intermediary. The second type of intervention is the closed method, 
using intermediaries (an agent bank). 
Bank Indonesia chooses between the open and closed method depending on several considerations, 
as follows: 
–  Whether Bank Indonesia would prefer market participants to know clearly about the 
intervention or not. 
–  Development of market sentiment, which may influence intervention effectiveness. 
–  Results of technical analysis. Foreign currency intervention can be more effective in 
influencing market expectations when reinforcing market price trends or momentum that are 
consistent with market participants’ technical analysis. 
–  Supply and demand for US dollars. Foreign currency intervention is unlikely to be effective 
when there are limited supplies of US dollars in situations of high demand for dollars. 
2.5  Effectiveness of foreign currency intervention 
Given Bank Indonesia’s objective for foreign currency intervention, efficacy is mainly assessed in 
relation to rupiah volatility. As seen in Graph 2, rupiah volatility has diminished since free floating was 
adopted, suggesting the effectiveness of intervention. Reduced rupiah volatility is positive for the 
economy in general. 
Graph 2 
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3.  Movement of the rupiah exchange rate 
This section traces the evolution of the rupiah from 1997 until 2004, illustrating the application of 
intervention policy: 
3.1  1997 to 1999: a weakening rupiah and high volatility (Graph 3) 
The rupiah in this period experienced strong fluctuations and severe downward pressure associated 
with the exchange rate crisis in Thailand. The driving force behind the rupiah turmoil included a fall in 
confidence of foreign investors as reflected in large capital outflows to pay maturing external debts, 
and speculative transactions. 
Graph 3 
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In addition, worsening domestic economic fundamentals, due to the crisis of public confidence in the 
banking system and spiralling inflation, were also major contributors to currency turbulence up to July 
1997. 
Contagion effects from the exchange rate turmoil in Thailand spread to other ASEAN countries after 
July 1997, and accordingly the rupiah was under downward pressure. The widening of the managed 
float’s intervention band on 11 July 1997, from 8% to 12% (with a lower limit of Rp 2,374 and an upper 
limit of Rp 2,678 per dollar) failed to abate the downward pressure. Capital outflows accelerated and 
speculative pressure strengthened. Consequently, the rupiah continued to weaken and, by mid-August 
1997, the exchange rate surpassed the upper limit of the intervention band. 
In response to the greater pressure on the rupiah and constraints on securing foreign exchange 
reserves, on 14 August 1997 Bank Indonesia decided to alter the foreign exchange system from 
managed float to free float. Subsequently rupiah swings became more volatile, particularly as a result 
of vigorous speculation against the rupiah. The volatility of the exchange rate altered the trading range 
from about Rp 2,500 to 2,600 per dollar in mid-July 1997 to Rp 2,700 to 3,000 per dollar. 
In addition, swap premiums also changed from about 9.0% to 30.1%. From mid-August to the end of 
September 1997, the exchange rate moved in a narrow range, between Rp 2,900 and Rp 3,000 per 
dollar. This narrow range resulted from government measures to tighten monetary conditions and 
active intervention by Bank Indonesia in the foreign currency market through spot, forward, and swap 
transactions. Intervention aimed at supplying dollars when the market was running out of them, 
stabilising exchange rate fluctuations, and providing guidance to market players. In addition, measures 
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non-residents were geared towards reducing speculative pressure on the rupiah. The restriction 
helped reduce rupiah volatility.  
After October 1997, the rupiah was again under pressure. The exchange rate became very turbulent 
and even traded at a low point of about Rp 16,650 per dollar in the middle of June 1998. To address 
this turmoil, Bank Indonesia added to the supply of dollars by lowering the statutory reserve 
requirement for foreign currency, and initiated a concerted intervention with the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore and Bank of Japan. Unfortunately the rupiah was stable only in the short run because of the 
crisis of confidence in Indonesia’s economic prospects and the high demand for dollars either for 
speculative transactions or for external debt payments. Because of that, attempts by Bank Indonesia 
to ease tight foreign currency liquidity in order to stabilise the rupiah were ineffective. 
During the period from November 1998 to January 1999 the exchange rate was relatively stable in a 
range of Rp 7,500 to 8,000, mainly due to the improvement of Indonesian economic fundamentals and 
a number of appropriate fiscal policy measures taken by the government.  
However, between February 1999 and March 1999, the rupiah depreciated to a range of Rp 8,500 to 
9,260. Depreciation of a few Asian region currencies (THB, SGD) and the postponement of a freeze of 
several insolvent commercial banks had impacted negatively on the exchange rate. 
By the end of 1999, the exchange rate had became relatively stable in a range of Rp 8,500 to 8,800. 
The stability of the exchange rate was partly the result of strong demand for rupiah related to fiscal 
year tax payments and loan disbursements from official creditors (the IMF, ADB, JEXIM). In addition, 
preparation for the upcoming general election had also contributed to positive sentiment over the 
outlook for the exchange rate. 
To sum up, in addition to negative sentiment, pressure against the exchange rate during the period 
1998-99 was mainly due to fundamental factors including huge private and government offshore debt, 
and associated deteriorating country risk. 
To stabilise the rupiah, the government employed several measures such as restoration of monetary 
stability, facilitation of trade finance by Bank Indonesia, restructuring of external corporate debt, and 
sterilisation of the domestic liquidity effect of government expenditures through sale of foreign 
exchange in the foreign exchange market. 
3.2  2000: rupiah weakening and increasing volatility (Graph 4) 
In the year 2000, the rupiah experienced renewed depreciation with increased volatility. The annual 
average rupiah exchange rate increased from Rp 7,850 to Rp 8,400. 
Graph 4 
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Leading into 2000, the rupiah had performed very well and strengthened against the US dollar. At the 
end of 1999 the newly elected government had generated optimism about social and political stability 
and economic recovery. These factors had resulted in an exchange rate close to a level of Rp 7,000 
per US dollar. 
However, the rupiah subsequently lost its support and weakened from early April 2000 due to social 
unrest, political uncertainties and the threat of disintegration of several regions in Indonesia. Moreover 
the rating agency Standard & Poor’s had also downgraded sovereign long-term and short-term debt 
(from CCC+ and C to become Selective Default/SD). All these factors had encouraged private 
individuals and corporations to sell rupiah for US dollars so that the exchange rate weakened to a 
level of Rp 8,000. 
From May 2000 to August 2000, the exchange rate continued to weaken and touched a level of 
Rp 9,600. The main factor was declining investor confidence in line with difficult social and political 
conditions ahead of the Annual Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly. From then until the 
end of 2000, the rupiah weakened further due to the strengthening of the US dollar against major 
currencies during the period, coupled with increasing corporate demand and social unrest related to 
terrorist bombing acts at a number of religious places at year end. In December 2000, the monthly 
average exchange rate was Rp 9,435, a fall of 22.9% through the year. The rupiah closed at the low 
level of Rp 9,675 at year end. 
To address the ongoing depreciation of the rupiah, Bank Indonesia started tightening monetary 
conditions through open market operations to absorb excess rupiah liquidity. The policy (SBI) interest 
rate was raised to give a signal of monetary tightening to the market, and to reduce the pressure on 
the exchange rate. Bank Indonesia also intervened in the foreign exchange market by selling 
US dollars, thereby providing an additional supply of dollars in the market as well as absorbing excess 
rupiah liquidity. 
3.3  2001: sharp rupiah depreciation (Graph 5) 
In the year 2001, the exchange rate sharply depreciated. The rupiah closed the year at Rp 10,400, a 
fall of 7% compared with the end-December 2000 level of Rp 9,675. 
In the first four months of 2001, the rupiah had depreciated due to panic buying of US dollars because 
of increasing social and political uncertainties in relation to the impeachment of the leadership of the 
nation. 
Graph 5 
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From then until July 2001, the exchange rate was relatively stable, moving sideways within a range of 
Rp 11,000 to 11,500. Although the rupiah remained undervalued in most eyes, market participants 
would not take positions, preferring instead to “wait and see”. Market focus was on the upcoming 
Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly. 
From August until September 2001, the rupiah strengthened quite sharply due to a smooth and 
successful People’s Consultative Assembly meeting to nominate a new President. Overall, improving 
market sentiment was probably related to better social, economic, and security conditions. The rupiah 
appreciated as far as Rp 8,454 during this period. 
The above conditions were not to last long, and the rupiah again slumped. In the final quarter of 2001, 
the exchange rate weakened and broke the psychological level of Rp 10,000 following profit taking 
after the strong rupiah phase associated with the successful transition of the national leadership. 
Reduced investor and corporate confidence about fundamental economic conditions was caused by 
the World Trade Center events on 11 September 2001, which were expected to slow global economic 
activity and badly affect the Indonesian economy.  
Again, to cope with sharp fluctuations of the exchange rate, Bank Indonesia conducted operations to 
absorb excess liquidity from the market through open market operations, and at the same time by 
intervention to sell US dollars in the market. Further, on 12 January 2001, Bank Indonesia issued 
regulation number 3/3/2001 which was aimed at limiting non-resident rupiah transactions with the 
potential to be used for speculation. 
3.4  2002: rupiah appreciation with lower volatility (Graph 6) 
In 2002, the rupiah sharply appreciated, closing at Rp 8,950, up 16.2% compared with the end of 
December 2001 (Rp 10,400). The rupiah had the most rapid appreciation of any currency in Asia 
during 2002. 
In the first half of 2002, the exchange rate was supported by a surplus on the current account, 
touching Rp 8,425 at its strongest point. However, exchange rate volatility returned as the result of the 
Bali bomb blast in October 2002. This event triggered panic buying of US dollars and the rupiah 
quickly depreciated to as high as Rp 9,425. Rapid progress in restoring internal domestic security 
improved market confidence, and the rupiah appreciated to a level below Rp 9,000. 
Graph 6 
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To limit foreign exchange speculation, Bank Indonesia continued to monitor the compliance of banks 
with regulation PBI No 3/3/2001 on the limitation of rupiah transactions and foreign currency credit 
expansion. In this regulation, forward sale and swap transactions beyond certain amounts with 
non-residents continued to be prohibited, unless for real economic transactions (ie underlying 
transactions). The monitoring process strengthened banks’ compliance, thereby helping to contain 
rupiah volatility. 
To monitor market developments, Bank Indonesia carefully scrutinised foreign exchange transactions 
through the Money Market Information Centre (PIPU). This monitoring aimed at ensuring that market 
transactions were on a normal track according to the common practice prevailing in the foreign 
exchange market. Monitoring is part of an early warning system aimed at identifying at an early stage 
transactions that could potentially destabilise the rupiah market. In addition, Bank Indonesia routinely 
conducts surveys to learn about market agents’ perceptions on the direction of exchange rate 
development. Results from this survey are one consideration in implementing exchange rate policy.  
Based on its monitoring of market conditions, Bank Indonesia engaged in moral suasion to ease 
market pressures, by informing market agents of Bank Indonsia’s view of matters. During the period 
under review, this was done on several occasions, including during the episode of panic buying of 
dollars by market players who over-reacted to the Bali tragedy. This policy strengthened market 
confidence and prevented further rupiah depreciation.  
Because of the knowledge that Bank Indonesia obtains through its monitoring activities, moral suasion 
can in some situations improve market perceptions of the implications of events that have triggered 
baseless rumours. Detection of negative rumours and data flows through PIPU and from surveys, as 
well as market condition assessments and information from other sources such as the government 
and international institutions, provides a valuable information base not readily available to the market 
as a whole. Therefore, moral suasion might be seen as actions to expand the relevant information set 
available to market agents, thereby coordinating perceptions and perspectives on sensitive issues. In 
doing so, Bank Indonesia can indirectly change the attitudes of market agents that dominantly affect 
the exchange rate. 
To complement these various policies, Bank Indonesia also undertook foreign exchange intervention 
by selling dollars in the market. These operations served two purposes. In addition to its role in 
absorbing excess rupiah liquidity, the policy also aimed at lessening volatility in the exchange rate by 
easing market pressures associated with the limited supply of dollars. In its implementation, this policy 
consistently took into account market psychology and the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves. 
Intervention was successful in reducing rupiah fluctuations throughout the reporting year, as shown in 
a declining average daily volatility of the exchange rate to 1.4% from 2.8% in the previous period. 
Looking at the level of the exchange rate, the foreign exchange intervention policy was also quite 
effective in maintaining the appreciating trend of the rupiah during 2002, and keeping the exchange 
rate below Rp 9,000 per US dollar until the end of the year. 
3.5  2003: rupiah stability (Graph 7) 
Over 2003, the rupiah was stable with a strengthening trend against the US dollar. The exchange rate 
closed the year at Rp 8,420, an appreciation of 6.3% as compared with the level at the end of 
December 2002 (Rp 8,950). The rupiah had traded within a range of Rp 8,175 to 9,088. 
Overall, various factors such as decreased risk, an adequate supply of foreign exchange in the 
market, higher returns on rupiah instruments, and improved economic fundamentals as well as Bank 
Indonesia’s commitment to maintaining exchange rate stability turned out to play a significant role in 
generating positive market sentiment and lifting the exchange rate. Nonetheless, the rapid capital 
inflows needed to be monitored closely because most were invested in short term portfolio assets (hot 
money) which could easily reverse. 
Bank Indonesia continuously monitored foreign currency transaction activities, either indirectly (off-site 
supervision) or directly (on-site supervision). Indirect supervision was conducted through the Dealing 
Room, and analysis of inter bank transaction data recorded with the PIPU, foreign exchange flow 
reports (LLD), as well as data provided by the banks’ monthly reports to Bank Indonesia. 
During the reporting period, Bank Indonesia conducted a number of on-site supervision visits to the 
main banks active in the market. Such visits were conducted ahead of the 2003 Annual Session of the 
People’s Consultative Assembly, when the political environment was marked by growing concerns. At BIS Papers No 24  185
 
the same time, foreign investors’ interest was shifting from rupiah-denominated bond investments 
(high yielding currency) to offshore stock exchanges (high growth assets), particularly on the back of 
efforts by a foreign financial institution to reduce its rupiah exposure. These supervisory measures, 
later combined with foreign currency intervention, proved sufficiently effective in subduing market 
pressures on the rupiah and led the currency to gradually stabilise near the Rp 8,400 level against the 
US dollar. 
Graph 7 



































During this period too, foreign currency intervention policy was intended, ultimately, to maintain 
exchange rate stability, especially at times when negative factors weighted on the rupiah. However, 
foreign exchange intervention was undertaken only when moral suasion was deemed ineffective in 
calming market participants and curbing excessive exchange rate movements. The sale of US dollars 
in the foreign exchange market was executed to provide a resistance level for the currency, to reduce 
the probability of exchange rate movements beyond that level. Policy implementation is always 
undertaken with due consideration for supply and demand conditions in the foreign currency market. In 
this context, technical analysis is used to identify “resistance levels” that if reinforced by intervention 
could interrupt the momentum that leads to panic buying of dollars. 
Foreign exchange intervention operations carried out during 2003 indeed proved effective in 
minimising excessive exchange rate volatility. This is observable from the rupiah’s performance during 
the year, which was far more stable than in previous years. 
To further support the supervision of foreign exchange transactions, Bank Indonesia also issued a 
number of regulations during the year, specifically Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 5/24/PBI/2003, 
dated 31 October 2003, in reference to Money Market Information Centres; and Circular Letter 
No 3/34/DPD, dated 24 December 2003, on procedures for the submission of data related to foreign 
exchange transaction through the PIPU. These regulations deal with reporting procedures, including 
timing, and impose sanctions should the reports provided by the banks not adhere to the regulations. 
In addition, PBI No 3/3/2001, dated 12 January 2001, on the limitation of rupiah transactions and the 
provision of foreign currency credit by banks, was streamlined. In general, the current regulations are 
deemed adequate to limit speculative activities in the foreign exchange markets. 186  BIS Papers No 24
 
3.6  January–September 2004: depreciation and relatively high volatility  
(Graphs 8 and 9) 
In 2004, the exchange rate weakened. From early January 2004 to September 2004 the rupiah 
depreciated by 9%, driven by several internal and external factors. 
Graph 8 






































The 2004 general election became the main domestic factor drawing the market’s attention. From the 
beginning of the election campaign (March 2004) until September 2004, the exchange rate fluctuated 
and tended to weaken. The successful conclusion of the first general election process provided a 
direct positive short term boost for the rupiah. However, the Kuningan bomb blast in September 2004 
undermined that positive sentiment. 
Graph 9 
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The main external factor was the recovery of the US economy, which led the Fed to increase the 
policy rate from 1.25% to 1.75%, producing a negative impact on the rupiah exchange rate against the 
US dollar.  
In the fourth quarter of 2004, especially after implementation of the Newly Improved Net Open Position 
regulation in September 2004, the rupiah became more stable (as reflected in reduced measured 
volatility). Meanwhile, the market continued to focus on the first 100 days of the new cabinet under the 
leadership of the newly elected President. 
4.  Policies linked to exchange rate 
Foreign currency intervention is not the only tool used by Bank Indonesia to maintain rupiah stability. 
Foreign currency intervention may not always be effective alone, depending on the current global 
financial market and the complexity of macro and micro economic conditions. 
To further support foreign exchange management, Bank Indonesia has issued a number of 
regulations, and conducts direct and indirect supervision as follows: 
1.  Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 3/3/2001 On The Restriction of Rupiah 
Transactions and Foreign Currency Credit Offered by Banks (12 January 2001). This 
regulation was introduced to restrict rupiah transactions offshore in order to mitigate the 
volatility of the rupiah. The new regulation is enforced so as to prohibit onshore banks from 
lending to non-resident accounts or transferring rupiah to offshore accounts. The regulation 
effectively prohibits offshore trading in rupiah. The rupiah, then, is a non-deliverable currency 
in the offshore market. 
2.  Conduct indirect supervision by monitoring foreign exchange transactions. 
Commercial banks dealing in foreign exchange must submit daily transactions reports 
through a PIPU terminal (on-line). The obligation to submit reports strongly supports the 
monitoring of up-to-date domestic foreign exchange activities. 
3.  Conduct a number of on-site supervision visits among the main commercial banks 
which actively trade in the foreign exchange market. For example, some bank visits were 
conducted in 2003 in the context of political uncertainty and shifting foreign investor 
sentiment (see above for more detail). 
4.  Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 6/20/PBI/2004 Improved Net Open Position 
(15 July  2004). The regulation was introduced to decrease speculative activities in the 
foreign exchange market, as reflected by the downward trend in the level of banks’ net open 
positions (NOP). 
5. Conclusion 
•  Since the implementation of free floating in August 1997, Indonesia has experienced 
movements of the exchange rate which are not only driven by fundamental factors reflecting 
economic conditions, but which are also substantially influenced by market reactions to 
non-economic events that have increased risk premia. 
•  Bank Indonesia, which is authorised to maintain exchange rate stability, has conducted 
several policies such as intensive monitoring of foreign exchange market transactions, moral 
suasion, and intervention in the domestic foreign exchange market. 
•  Foreign exchange market intervention can be used to address unwarranted exchange rate 
movements stemming from temporary shocks. It is not an independent policy instrument and 
cannot generate permanent changes in exchange rates, especially when the objectives are 
inconsistent with macro economic policies. 
•  To further reduce unwelcome fluctuations, Bank Indonesia has issued several regulations 
such as limitations on transactions by non-residents and on net open positions, and has 
conducted both indirect (off-site) and direct (on-site) supervision of market participants. 